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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE 
IDEA OF PROGRESS 
Daniel A. Farber* 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. By William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1994. Pp. vii, 438. 
$49.95. 
Statutory interpretation, Professor Eskridge1 observes, has been 
a neglected intellectual stepchild, "the Cinderella of legal scholar-
ship" (p. 1). If so, then Eskridge himself may qualify as the messen-
ger with the glass slipper who has rescued the waif from obscurity. 
For over a decade, he has been in the forefront of research on the 
subject and has played a leading role in the scholarly renaissance 
now underway. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation synthesizes and 
extends his far-reaching contributions to the subject. 
Even beyond its theoretical sophistication and extensive schol-
arship, perhaps the book's most attractive feature is the internal 
tension between sometimes opposing viewpoints. Eskridge can-
didly admits that he admires conflicting normative visions, for his 
experiences have given him a prismatic rather than a unified vision: 
My approach can be described as one of critical pragmatism. It re-
flects a balance among three facets of my life: my thoroughly middle-
class background and exposure to legal work through the usual in-
sider institutions (Ivy League law school, clerkship, tony law firm), 
versus my experience as a gay man (which makes me a pariah looking 
at legal practice from the outside), versus my fascination with the phe-
nomenon of scarcity and its [economic] implications for public life. 
My experience sweeps widely if not comprehensively across the 
American political spectrum.2 
Consequently, Eskridge•s- discussion tends to be dialectical, embrac-
ing first one viewpoint and then another. His conclusions are more 
nuanced than some readers may expect from an outspokenly "pro-
gressive" legal scholar. The price of these internal intellectual ten-
sions is a reduction in theoretical elegance and rhetorical sweep, 
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty, and Acting Associate 
Vice President for Academic Affairs, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D. 
1975, University of Illinois. - Ed. I would like to thank Jim Chen and Phil Frickey for 
comments on a previous draft. 
1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Visiting Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. P. 200. Eskridge's "critical pragmatism" involves a general presumption in favor of 
existing legal practices, except where those practices fail to respond adequately to excluded 
groups. See text accompanying notes 57-61. 
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but the result is a more fruitful and profound engagement with the 
issues. Throughout the book, although Eskridge's conclusions are 
often debatable, he never fails to engage opposing viewpoints hon-
estly and to acknowledge their legitimacy. 
This review begins by considering Eskridge's quarrel with his 
major opponents - textualists such as Judge Frank Easterbrook 
and Justice Antonin Scalia. It then probes Eskridge's understand-
ing of "dynamic interpretation." Dynamic interpretation's distinc-
tive feature is the view that statutory meaning changes over time, 
but this view need not be hostile to the need of the legal system for 
continuity and fidelity to the past. Eskridge's approach may have 
roots in the activism of the Warren Court, but it also turns out to 
have some intriguing affinities with the work of Alexander Bickel, a 
legal-process3 critic of judicial activism. Finally, the review revisits 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 4 the leading statutory-
interpretation opinion involving affirmative action - an opinion 
that has fascinated Eskridge and other interpretation scholars. 
I. DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION VERSUS NEW TEXTUALISM 
In evaluating the argument for dynamic interpretation, we may 
begin profitably by considering its main current competitor, the re-
cent revival of textualism. Eskridge argues that dynamic interpreta-
tion is inevitable.5 This is a difficult proposition to establish 
empirically. At least one might say, however, that textualists have 
failed to provide a counterexample in their own practice of statu-
tory interpretation. This failure is all the more revealing because 
opposition to dynamic interpretation is so central to the textualist 
creed. We first consider the textualists' unsuccessful effort to elimi-
nate dynamic interpretation, and then briefly consider the argu-
ments in favor of a dynamic approach. 
A. The New Textualistism 
When interpreting statutes, modern courts generally have felt 
free to rely on an eclectic mix of reliance on text, legislative history, 
statutory purpose, and public policy.6 This eclecticism allows room 
for dynamic interpretation for judges who are so inclined. Begin-
ning in the 1980s, textualists challenged this eclectic approach in 
3. For a comprehensive discussion of the legal process school, see the introduction by 
Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994). 
4. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
5. To buttress this claim, Eskridge uses the history of federal labor injunctions as a case 
study. See pp. 81-106. 
6. For a fuller discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Inter-
pretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990). 
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favor of a much more structured method of statutory interpreta-
tion.7 Their favored approach claims to be rigorously nondynamic.8 
Textualists, as Judge Easterbrook has explained, stress that the 
proper forum for policymaking is the legislature; the role of judges 
is to apply statutes as written, without attempting to adapt them to 
changing times: "Laws are designed to bind, to perpetuate a solu-
tion devised by the enacting legislature, and do not change unless 
the legislature affirmatively enacts something new .... Law does 
not change in meaning as the political culture changes. "9 
There are several corollaries to this antidynamic thesis. Textual-
ists maintain that the ideas of legislative purpose and legislative in-
tent are incoherent: "Legislation is compromise. Compromises 
have no spirit; they just are."10 Hence, if the legislature has failed 
to speak clearly to an issue, the argument continues, a court should 
not try to fill the gap. When the court reaches the limits of a stat-
ute's clear instructions, the only thing to do is to put the statute 
aside and admit that it provides no basis for ruling.11 As Judge Eas-
terbrook puts it, "[w]hen the text has no answer, a court should not 
put one there on the basis of legislative reports or moral philosophy 
- or economics! Instead the interpreter should go to some other 
source of rules. "12 Refusing to stretch statutory language or fill 
gaps has another major advantage: Knowing that courts will follow 
only therr plain language, legislators will have an incentive to draft 
carefully and precisely,13 so textualism helps foster the democratic 
process.14 
What this adds up to, as Judge Easterbrook puts it, is a "rela-
tively unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation,"15 of-
fered in the _name of upholding the legislature's monopoly on 
policymaking.16 Only this mechanical approach "can be reconciled 
7. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 61 (1994). 
8. As Eskridge has observed, "[f]onnalism posits that judicial interpreters can and should 
be tightly constrained by the objectively determinable meaning of a statute; if unelected 
judges exercise much discretion in these cases, democratic governance is threatened." Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 646 (1990). 
9. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 69 (footnote omitted). 
10. Id. at 68. 
11. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533 (1983). 
12. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 68. 
13. See Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1022 (1992). 
14. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-45 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part). 
15. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 67. 
16. This goal, however, is not consistent with textualists' use of substantive canons and 
strong "clear statement" rules. See pp. 280-83, 297. 
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with the premises of democratic governance."17 According to tex-
tualists, this approach is also consistent with the essence of the judi-
cial function, which is to submit to "the lines of the logical and 
analytical categories" and to operate under clear rules rather than 
fuzzy principles.1s 
The textualist vision of statutory interpretation is sharply at 
odds with Eskridge's. Textualism aspires to be resolutely 
nondynamic and insulated from judicial value judgments. Its aspi-
ration to formalist simplicity is equally distant from Eskridge's 
vision. Rather than seeking a cut-and-dried method of interpreta-
tion, he criticizes courts for attempting to simplify their tasks in-
stead of engaging the deep complexities of interpretation (p. 145). 
Thus, although he utilizes some of the same intellectual apparatus 
as the textualists,19 ultimately Eskridge's theory is almost entirely 
opposed to theirs. 
B. The Failure of Textualism 
Not surprisingly, textualism has not gone unchallenged.20 Ac-
cording to its critics, textualism fails on its own terms by leaving 
judges free to inject their values into statutory interpretation. Crit-
ics charge that courts have "begun to use textualist methods of con- -
struction that routinely allow them to attribute 'plain meaning' to 
statutory language that most observers would characterize as am-
biguous or internally inconsistent," and even to attribute plain 
meaning to language that "was nearly universally believed to have a 
contrary meaning" for many decades.21 Others describe textualism 
as increasing the tension between democracy and the rule of law 
and serving "as a cover for the injection of conservative values into 
statutes."22 Room for doubt exists, then, about whether textualism 
is living up to the promises of its advocates. 
17. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 63. 
18. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 581, 593 (1989-90); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989). 
19. Most notable is public-choice theory, which plays a prominent role in both Eskridge's 
and Easterbrook's scholarship. 
20. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 861-74 (1992); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on 
Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40-
66 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and 
the Rule of Law, 45 V AND. L. REV. 533, 549-54 (1992); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. 
Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism 
in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TuL. L. REv. 803, 825-31 (1994). 
21. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to 
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 (1995). 
22. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Fore-
word: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 77 (1994). 
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These concerns are illustrated by Justice Scalia's opinion in BFP 
v. Resolution Trust Corp. 23 BFP involved a Bankruptcy Code pro-
vision that invalidates certain prebankruptcy transfers unless the 
debtor received "a reasonably equivalent value. "24 The transfer in 
BFP was a foreclosure sale on the debtor's real estate for a fraction 
of its market value. Applying the bankruptcy provision to foreclo-
sures had given the lower courts a great deal of difficulty because 
prices at forced sales are not infrequently depressed. Some courts 
had set aside such sales when the sale price was well below fair 
market value.25 Others, such as the lower court in BFP, had found 
compelling policy reasons for ignoring the price disparity despite 
the statutory language.26 Justice Scalia upheld the foreclosure, but 
without adopting the policy-oriented rationale of the lower court. 
According to Justice Scalia, whatever amount is received in a 
lawful foreclosure, however minute, is simply by definition "a rea-
sonably equivalent value. "27 Justice Scalia argued that the value of 
property inevitably is depressed if it is the subject of foreclosure 
proceedings.28 "[I]t is no more realistic to ignore that characteristic 
of the property (the fact that state foreclosure law permits the 
mortgagee to sell it at forced sale) than it is to ignore other price-
affecting characteristics (such as the fact that state zoning law per-
mits the owner of the neighboring lot to open a gas station)."29 
Thus, under Justice Scalia's view, if a mortgagee buys the property 
at a small fraction of its market value, the price paid is simply its 
true value under the circumstances. 
Whatever else may be said of Justice Scalia's argument, it hardly 
corresponds with the textualist call for a "relatively unimaginative, 
mechanical process of interpretation."30 No ordinary speaker of 
English would use the phrase "reasonably equivalent value" to 
mean "fair market value except in the case of a foreclosure, when it 
23. 114 s. Ct. 1757 (1994). 
24. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994). 
25. The leading case is Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203-
04 (5th Cir. 1980) (setting aside sale when purchase price was Jess than 57.7% of fair market 
value and indicating in dicta that any sale for less than 70% should be set aside). 
26. For a discussion of pre-BFP law, see Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales 
as Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 
933, 936-53 (1985). 
27. See BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1761-62. 
28. See 114 S. Ct. at 1761-62. 
29. 114 S. Ct. at 1762 (citation omitted). It is some indication of Justice Scalia's discom-
fort with his own interpretation of the statute that he explicitly "emphasize(d] that our opin-
ion today covers only mortgage foreclosures of real estate. The considerations bearing upon 
other foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example) may be different." 114 
S. Ct. at 1761 n.3. As a matter of logic, of course, these other situations are indistinguishable 
on the basis of Justice Scalia's rationale. 
30. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 67. 
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means whatever the debtor receives." At most, Scalia's argument 
would support only a definition of fair value as the expected price 
at a foreclosure sale, not the actual price in one particular sale. 
Moreover, as Justice Souter's dissent cogently demonstrates, Justice 
Scalia's interpretation of the statute simply makes a hash of Con-
gress's deliberate decision to subject involuntary transfers to Bank-
ruptcy Code section 548.31 
As Eskridge and Frickey have observed, "BFP is an astonishing 
decision for a textualist."32 Their overall evaluation of the opinion 
is biting: "By giving its policy-driven result an unsupportable for-
malist gloss, Justice Scalia's opinion flunks any requirement of judi-
cial candor."33 Harsh, perhaps, but not entirely inaccurate. If this 
is what textualism can do in the hands of its foremost proponent, 
we may wonder how well it will function in other hands. BFP pro-
vides little reassurance about the ability of textualism to constrain 
result-oriented judges. 
Textualism does, however, seem to have the ability to persuade 
those judges subscribing to it that their interpretations are coerced 
by the text, even when this claim objectively seems quite implausi-
ble. Consider Justice Scalia's striking dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. 34 Sweet Home 
involved the Endangered Species Act35 ban on "taking" endan-
gered species; "taking" was defined to encompass any effort to 
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect."36 The Secretary of the Interior had defined "harm" in turn 
to include a significant habitat modification, if the modification "ac-
tually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential be-
havioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."37 The 
question before the Court was whether this was a reasonable read-
ing of the statute. In a careful opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court 
upheld the agency's interpretation of the statute.3s 
Justice Scalia wrote a vitriolic dissent, which amply lives up to 
Eskridge's comment that he finds the "mists of the Middle Ages" 
more relevant than recent sources of law (p. 271 ). The centerpiece 
of Justice Scalia's dissent is his assertion that the word "take," as 
applied to wildlife, is "as old as the law itself" and means "to re-
31. See BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1767-78 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
32. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 83. 
33. Id. at 84. 
34. 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2421-31 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
35. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
36. 16 u.s.c. § 1532 (1994). 
37. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2410. 
38. See 115 S. Ct. at 2407. 
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duce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human control."39 
"It should take the strongest evidence," he said, "to make us be-
lieve that Congress has defined a term in a manner repugnant to its 
ordinary and traditional sense."40 This is an ipse dixit in the grand 
manner. Although a reasonable member of Congress conceivably 
might have had in mind the ancient meaning of the term "take" in 
game law, that legislative understanding was hardly inevitable. Af-
ter all, the statute was not an amendment to other game or fishing 
laws but instead was an aggressive addition to federal environmen-
tal law, in the context of which the medieval meaning of the word 
"take" might not have immediately sprung to the legislators' minds. 
Surely, a member of Congress who wanted to know what the word 
meant would have been more likely to look at the broad language 
of the bill's definition than to consult a treatise on game law. Jus-
tice Scalia's reading of the statute may not be impermissible, but 
under the Chevron41 doctrine, he had the burden of showing that 
the agency's contrary interpretation was not merely wrong but 
unreasonable.42 
Justice Scalia's dissent also falls far short of overcoming the 
strong textual argument in the other direction. The term "harm" 
naturally encompasses habitat modification.43 It would be peculiar 
to say that Mrs. O'Leary's cow did not harm the people of Chicago 
when she kicked over the lantern that started the Chicago fire. 
Similarly, as a matter of ordinary English usage, someone who de-
stroys the breeding grounds used by an endangered species or elim-
inates its food supply surely "harms" them. 
Justice Scalia's view that the statute unambiguously precludes 
the agency's interpretation is at best an example of self-deception. 
The reason for this self-deception is not hard to find. It leaps out of 
the opening paragraph of the dissent, when Justice Scalia says the 
agency interpretation "imposes unfairness to the point of financial 
ruin - not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who 
finds his land conscripted to national zoological use. "44 Justice 
Scalia's textualism seems to have blinded him to the extent to which 
he engaged in dynamic interpretation based on conservative public 
39. 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
40. 115 S. Ct. at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
41. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984). 
42. See 467 U.S. at 843. 
43. For instance, one dictionary contemporaneous with the statute defines harm as "phys-
ical or material injury; hurt; damage; detriment; misfortune." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH 
CENTURY D1cnoNARY 827 (2d ed. 1977). 
44. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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values - values that also may command the support of the current, 
rather than the enacting, Congress.45 
At one point, Eskridge caustically remarks that textualism 
reduces statutory interpretation "to a linguistic shell game played 
by amateurs" (p. 134). Perhaps it is unfair to accuse Justice Scalia 
of deliberately hiding the statutory "pea" in Sweet Home, for he 
seems to have fooled even himself.46 But Eskridge's larger point 
remains valid. Like other reductionist approaches to statutory in-
terpretation, textualism fails to provide sufficient determinacy in 
practice to squeeze value judgments out of the interpretative pro-
cess (pp. 38-47). Like it or not, we seem to be stuck with some 
degree of dynamic interpretation, even from judges who vehe-
mently proclaim their desire to avoid it." 
C. The Legitimacy of Dynamic Interpretation 
As Eskridge recognizes, assuming that some degree of dynamic 
interpretation is inevitable, this fact does not necessarily mean that 
it is desirable. We might instead, like textualists, want to reduce the 
amount of dynamic interpretation to the minimum (p. 6). The 
worry, of course, is that courts armed with dynamic interpretation 
will usurp the legislature's superior position as lawmaker. Eskridge 
devotes Part II of the book to exploring various jurisprudential the-
ories, ranging from classical liberalism to critical race theory, as 
they bear on this question. He concludes that under all of these 
theories some form of dynamic interpretation is legitimate. 
Three of Eskridge's arguments are quite simple but ultimately 
quite powerful. First, even in hierarchical institutions such as the 
military, lower-level agents are recognized as having necessary au-
thority to improvise and adapt their orders to changing circum-
stances (p. 124). Modem organizational theory stresses the need 
for flexibility and innovation by subordinates rather than central-
ized, top-down decisionmaking.47 From an organizational point of 
view, rule-bound decisionmaking is unlikely to succeed in a diverse 
or rapidly changing environment. 
To show the need for improvisation in adapting orders to actual 
conditions, Eskridge refers to Judge Richard Posner's analogy48 to a 
platoon commander who has lost touch with headquarters in the 
45. As Eskridge points out, Justice Scalia and other members of the Rehnquist Court 
often smuggle in their public values through references to canons of interpretation, some-
times freshly minted, that embody conservative political preferences. See pp. 280-83, 297. 
46. Justice Scalia himself has observed that he usually sees no reason for agency defer-
ence because he finds most statutes clear. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Adminis-
trative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 521. 
47. See Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278, 1279, 1286-87 
(1993). 
48. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 269-73 (1990). 
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middle of a battle (p. 124). The severely disciplined German army 
provides a striking example - it not only tolerated but encouraged 
the exercise of discretion by subordinates during World War II.49 
The French army, in contrast, was run on formalist principles, with 
a highly centralized organization that could not adjust to the unex-
pected.50 In a "system wholly at odds with the stereotypical view of 
the German army as composed of fanatical soldiers blindly obeying 
the dictates of a Prussian general staff," the Germans had "remark-
ably little paperwork" compared with the Americans, left tactical 
decisions to the officers at the front, and gave medals largely for the 
exercise of initiative on the battlefield.51 This organizational system 
was "well adapted to the task of getting men fo fight against heavy 
odds in a confused, fluid setting far from army headquarters and 
without precisely detailed instructions" and contributed to the abil-
ity of the Germans to outmaneuver larger but less flexible oppo-
nents.s2 Surely, the degree to which federal courts are subservient 
to legislators cannot exceed the degree to which Teutonic lieuten-
ants were subordinate to generals! 
Second, some degree of dynamism seems inherent in the enter-
prise of interpretation itself. At the most abstract level, Eskridge 
argues that all interpretation necessarily involves an effort to align 
the world of the reader with that of the author, making static inter-
pretation impossible (pp. 60-65). More specifically - and perhaps 
more persuasively for those unsympathetic with contemporary liter-
ary theory - he points out that legal interpretation generally in-
volves some dynamic element in areas ranging from the law of 
contracts to the law of trusts (pp. 122-23). Furthermore, in other 
legal systems, some with highly textualist aspirations, dynamic in-
terpretation of statutes is well-accepted.53 Even textualists utilize 
canons of interpretation that in practice provide a dynamic element 
(pp. 118-19). Thus, dynamic interpretation is hardly a frightening 
novelty. 
Third, it is difficult to see how the legal system can function ef-
fectively without some degree of dynamic interpretation. It is im-
practical to revise the entire United States Code every few years; 
inevitably, some provisions must be left in place for decades, if not 
longer. Intolerable anomalies would develop without some way to 
keep these provisions in tune with the changing legal framework 
49. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND 
WHY THEY Do IT 14-18 (1989). 
50. See id. at 43. 
51. See id. at 16-17. 
52. See id. at 17. 
53. Seep. 345 n.2. For further discussion, see Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist: 
Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Perspective, 81 CORNELL L. REV. {forthcoming 1996). 
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(pp. 48-49). Moreover, as the understandings of the law by those 
involved in its everyday administration evolve over time, abrupt ef-
forts to restore the original understanding can undo justifiable pat-
terns of reliance by the relevant actors. Thus, as Richard Pierce 
observes, for essentially conservative "rule of law" reasons, a com-
pletely nondynamic approach to interpretation would be a 
mistake.s4 
Those who would dismiss dynamic interpretation as a form of 
judicial activism would do well to consider Peter Strauss's explana-
tion of its traditional role in administrative law: 
Administrative agencies are continuing bodies with proactive respon-
sibilities, acting under the oversight of the political branches as well as 
the judiciary. We anticipate that they will change course; they are in 
effect the preferred managers of change. . . . Whatever else, the 
agency . . . will not have encountered issues of statutory meaning 
freed of consideration of purpose, politics, or contemporary 
understandings.ss 
Similarly, Strauss is critical of Justice Scalia's BFP opinion for its 
reluctance to recognize the established role of federal judges as "of-
ficials with acknowledged law-generating authority" sufficient to 
put flesh on the reasonableness standard of the Bankruptcy Code.56 
On this score, Strauss and Eskridge are the conservatives, whose 
views reflect established legal practices and traditions, while Judge 
Easterbrook and Justice Scalia are the radicals. 
II. THE DYNAMICS OF INTERPRETATION 
The difficult question, then, is not whether to engage in dynamic 
interpretation, but how to do so, and in particular, how freely to do 
so. It is easy to interpret Eskridge - dynamically - as an enthusi-
astic advocate of. judicial activism in statutory interpretation. Es-
tablishing the argument for dynamic interpretation is after all the 
main purpose of the book (p. 5), and the word "dynamic" seems to 
connote activism. This interpretation, however, misreads his views. 
As we will see, Eskridge is actually somewhat cautious in his view 
of the judicial role, and his work reflects some of the concerns 
raised by legal process theorists such as Alexander Bickel. While 
Eskridge wishes to leave room for legal evolution, he is also quite 
aware of the limits of the judicial role in legal change; like Bickel, 
he is not lacking in awareness of the "passive virtues." 
54. See Pierce, supra note 21, at 765·66. Thus, one of Eskridge's most thoughtful critics 
agrees that dynamic interpretation is appropriate, but only under more limited circumstances 
than Eskridge would countenance. See John Nagel, Review Essay: Newt Gingrich, Dynamic 
Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2209, 2236 (1995). 
55. Peter Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. 
Cr. REv. 429, 437. 
56. Id. at 454. 
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A. Critical Pragmatism and the Judicial Role 
Eskridge's views lay exposed to misinterpretation in part be-
cause he is attracted strongly to conflicting jurisprudential visions. 
He discusses three quite different jurisprudential theories: tradi-
tional liberal theory, legal-process theory, and normativism. Each 
has its appeal: 
Most of us find something attractive in each one, and the three theo-
ries together more accurately capture our political society than any 
one separately. We value individual autonomy (liberalism), but we 
also understand our interdependence (legal process) and crave a soci-
ety that stands for values we can be proud of (nonnativism). As a 
result, we usually favor limited government, but endorse state regula-
tion to address social and economic problems and to foster national 
values. [p. 109] 
Consequently, Eskridge calls for a "dialectic" among these theories 
(p. 109). His own preferred approach is a "critically pragmatic one 
in which the rule of law is grounded in and follows everyday prac-
tice, but which reevaluates practice in light of rank discriminations" 
(p. 109). 
Eskridge's critical pragmatism recognizes the limits on judicial 
innovation.57 As he puts it, courts are pressed from below and 
above in statutory cases (p. 49). From below, the Supreme Court 
often finds that agencies, private actors, and lower courts already 
have interpreted statutes in ways that have become deeply embed-
ded in society (p. 66). From above, the Court's interpretation faces 
the threat of being overruled by Congress. Thus, the courts nor-
mally must respect the interpretative status quo rather than upset 
the balance in the name of either social progress or the original 
understanding. This principle is embedded in a number of well-
established canons of interpretation such as the following: 
• Reenactment rule: when Congress reenacts a statute, it incorpo-
rates settled interpretations of the reenacted statute. 
• Super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents. 
• Acquiescence rule: follow unbroken line of lower court decisions 
interpreting statute. 
• Rule of deference to agency interpretations unless contrary to 
plain meaning of statute or unreasonable. [pp. 324-25] 
These rules reflect formal recognition of the broader principle that 
other legal actors hem in a judge's room for interpretation. 
Thus, the Supreme Court never writes on a clean slate and 
never has the final word. For this reason, Eskridge endorses what 
he considers the most modest forms of dynamic interpretation using 
"pragmatic, situational metaphors," such as analogies to private law 
57. As another reviewer trenchantly put it, "Eskridge has painted a picture of dynamic 
interpretation by a nondynamic judiciary." William D. Popkin, Book Review, 45 J. LEGAL 
Eouc. 297, 301 (1995) (reviewing DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION). 
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doctrines like cy pres (pp. 192-93). A pragmatic interpretation is 
one that "most intelligently and creatively 'fits' into the complex 
web of social and legal practices" (p. 201). In most cases, Eskridge 
believes, the courts should defer to settled practice, rather than 
seeking to anticipate future progress.58 Quoting the Roman Em-
peror Hadrian, he reminds us that "[l]aws change more slowly than 
custom, and though dangerous when they fall behind the times are 
more dangerous still when they presume to anticipate customs" 
(p. 201 ). Only in the exceptional case should judges "break away" 
from current practice (p. 200). 
Thus, when evaluating a possible interpretation of a statute, a 
court first should consider whether the interpretation comports 
with professional, social, and political practice. If the interpretation 
would disrupt current practice, the court then should consider 
whether such a disruption is normatively justified (p. 206). In the 
typical case, the court's role is essentially conservative, not in terms 
of the political spectrum, but in terms of current social practices 
that the court attempts to preserve. Only in an extraordinary case 
does the court contemplate disruption through interpretations that 
"press beyond or criticize" existing conventions and traditions in 
order to re-ground the legitimacy of the legal system in its underly-
ing norms (p. 201). 
Notably, even when disrupting current practice, the ultimate 
goal is conservative rather than transformational - to preserve the 
social order rather than overturn it. Both at the beginning (p. 2) 
and end of the book (p. 306), Eskridge invokes Hadrian's view 
about the need to attract the loyalty of downtrodden groups. 
Rather than applying the law rigidly, Hadrian believed that flexibil-
ity was necessary in order to preserve the legal system's viability: 
All nations who have perished up to this time have done so for lack of 
generosity: Sparta would have survived longer had she given her Hel-
ots some interest in that survival .... I wished to postpone as long as 
pos[s]ible, and to avoid, if it can be done, the moment when the 
barbarians from without and the slaves within will fall upon a world 
which they have been forced to respect from afar, or to serve from 
below, but the profits of which are not for them. I was determined 
that even the most wretched, from the slaves who clean the city sew-
ers to the famished barbarians who hover along the frontiers, should 
have an interest in seeing Rome endure. [p. 306] 
Thus, even seemingly disruptive legal 'interpretations ultimately 
may serve the long-term maintenance of the legal order. 
58. 'fypically, courts lag behind rather than lead changes in the political culture, making 
them unlikely candidates for a leadership role in social change. See James A. Stimson et al., 
Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. PoL. Scr. REV. 543, 555-56, 560 (1995) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court reflects public opinion less than other institutions and is driven by changes in 
its own composition plus rational perceptions of the anticipated effects of changing public 
opinions). 
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Disruptive interpretations, while unusual, are also critically im-
portant. Eskridge's views about disruption can be plumbed best by 
considering two cases that he discusses extensively. Both cases in-
volve gay rights, a cause about which he cares passionately. In both 
cases, he favors an interpretation at odds with the legal status quo, 
but only with misgivings. 
The first of these cases is Boutilier v. INS,59 which involved the 
application of an immigration restriction to homosexuals. The stat-
ute required the Immigration and Naturalization Service to exclude 
individuals found by the Public Health Service to have "psycho-
pathic personalities," a term that Congress apparently anticipated 
would include gays and lesbians. Although the Court interpreted 
the restriction to apply to gay men, Eskridge believes that a dissent-
ing Court of Appeals judge had a better view. Judge Moore had 
dissented because he was reluctant to read the statute to apply to 
such figures as Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo. 60 Moore was 
a moderate Republican who found the exclusion policy "unnecessa-
rily hurtful, and indeed 'wasteful and inefficient in light of the pro-
ductive people it swept within its exclusionary net" (p. 202). It is 
only Moore's dissent, Eskridge remarks, "that inspires admiration 
today" (p. 202). In Boutilier, then, Eskridge would favor a rupture 
in prior social understandings in favor of an oppressed group.61 
The second case is Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center v. Georgetown University, 62 which was brought by a 
gay rights group seeking official recognition from a Catholic univer-
sity. Eskridge considers this a very difficult case because it pitted 
two conflicting moral world views against each other (pp. 181, 185). 
Although he finds none of the opinions in the case fully satisfactory, 
he seems most drawn to the opinion of Judge Mack, who attempted 
to accommodate the conflicting interests in the case and open lines 
of communication between the college and the gay community.63 
By excusing the University from granting formal recognition to the 
gay group, she acknowledged the school's religious objections while 
requiring the University to provide equal access and benefits, thus 
meeting the group's practical needs (p. 178). The result of this deci-
sion was to foster a fruitful dialogue and the creation of a new con-
sensus within the university (p. 182). Here, the best available 
59. 387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
60. Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J., dissenting), affd., 387 U.S. 
118 (1967). 
61. Such a rupture ultimately took place when changed cultural and medical understand· 
ings made the Public Health Service unwilling to perform its role under the statute of certify-
ing gays as psychologically unhealthy. See pp. 66-67. 
62. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en bane). 
63. Pp. 188-89. Eskridge nevertheless has some reservations about Mack's opinion. See 
p.192. 
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judicial action was not to rupture prior traditions but to mediate 
between conflicting norms. 
B. Statutory Interpretation and the Lincolnian Tension 
As we have seen, a central theme of Dynamic Statutory Interpre-
tation concerns the tension between the usual role of courts as 
restrained agents of tradition and their occasional need to breach 
the status quo in light of fundamental moral imperatives. As 
Eskridge explains, this tension is also a critical feature of legal-
process theory: 
The genius of legal process theory is its ability to mediate substan-
tive divisions through procedure and to press the polity toward· new 
consensuses over time. Its danger is that procedural regularity may 
become a cover for the triumph of a partial substantive position and 
consensus a shield for an unjust or inefficient status quo. The chal-
lenge for a legal process theory of statutory interpretation is to find a 
balance - one that must be constantly recalibrated - between pro-
cedural mediation and substantive responsibility. [p. 143] 
Within the legal-process movement, Alexander Bickel most deeply 
grappled with this tension.64 Despite great differences in their phil-
osophical and political outlooks, Bickel's work finds a resonant 
chord in Eskridge's jurisprudence. 
Bickel believed that law must rest on fundamental principles, 
but also that it must duly consider practical realities. Analogizing a 
judge's position to Abraham Lincoln's on the issue of slavery, 
Bickel referred to the tension between principles and practical real-
ities as the "Lincolnian tension," which he saw as pervasive in the 
Supreme Court's work.65 It is the Court's task, Bickel argued, to 
resolve the "tension between principle and the hard - at any rate, 
often ominous - facts of the day's politics."66 The judicial "art" is 
the creative extension of the law's moral tradition to new situations 
and problems, but with a prudent regard for the need to generate 
societal support.67 
Thus, like Eskridge, Bickel believed that the normal judicial role 
is to maintain continuity with current social norms. More than Es-
kridge, however, Bickel doubted that the Court effectively could 
force society into the future; he had little belief in "the intuitive 
judicial capacity to identify the course of progress.>'68 Nor did he 
64. For an illuminating discussion of Bickel's thought, see Anthony T. Kronrnan, Alexan-
der Bicke/'s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE LJ. 1567 (1985). 
65. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 68 (1962). 
66. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 98 
(1970). 
67. See BICKEL, supra note 65, at 66-69. 
68. BICKEL, supra note 66, at 173-74. 
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believe that the Court had the power to compel social change.69 
Bickel, however, did not see the Court as merely a passive reflec-
tion of current practices. He thought it must aspire to the role of 
moral teacher,70 for society also "values the capacity of the judges 
to draw its attention to issues of the largest principle that may have 
gone unheeded in the welter of its pragmatic doings."71 
Bickel's model of law was "flexible, pragmatic, slow-moving, 
highly political"; without "pretense to intellectual valor," it rested 
on a "mature skepticism" about the validity of any catechism of 
moral values.72 Yet in Bickel's view, law cannot be unprincipled, 
for in order to maintain its stability and coherence, a civil society 
must rest on a moral foundation.73 "A valueless politics and value-
less institutions are shameful and shameless and, what is more, 
man's nature is such that he finds them, and life with and under 
them, insupportable."74 That moral foundation is not, however, to 
be found in abstract philosophical theory, but in an evolving tradi-
tion: "We hold to the values of the past provisionally only, in the 
knowledge that they will change, but we hold to them as guides."75 
Bickel was deeply concerned with how law can generate the 
consent necessary to maintain the social order in a free society. Ul-
timately, he believed, law can operate only through consent, for a 
free government lacks the power to exact obedience from large 
numbers of people through direct coercion.76 As a result, when the 
law sharply conflicts with the norms of a significant segment of soci-
ety, a dialogue must take place between that group and the courts77 
a dialogue in which civil disobedience can, within limits, play an 
important part.78 A minority with intense preferences cannot be 
coerced at an acceptable cost by the majority and therefore often 
must be accommodated.79 
As his closing quotation from Hadrian makes clear, Eskridge 
also is quite concerned about how the legal system can earn the 
consent of dissatisfied minority groups.so His account of the devel-
opment of gay rights also has a distinctly Bickelian tone as he ex-
69. See id. at 91. 
70. See Kronman, supra note 64, at 1583 & n.73. 
71. BICKEL, supra note 66, at 177. 
72. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 4 (1975). 
73. See id. at 23. 
74. Id. at 24. 
75. Id. 
76. See id. at 106. 
77. See id. at 111. 
78. See id. at 112-14. 
79. See id. at 102. 
80. See p. 306. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59. 
May 1996] Statutory Interpretation 1561 
plains how the legal system adapted to the demands of an alienated 
minority. According to Eskridge, the social consensus in favor of 
repressing homosexuality continued until the Stonewall Riot, which 
began a period of gay resistance and ultimately forced a change in 
social practices (pp. 53-55). In the end, rather than coming from 
"above" - the courts - legal change came from "below" -
through Stonewall, the gay rights movement, and other acts of 
resistance (p. 72). The result was to override prior legal interpreta-
tions in Boutilier and force an accommodation to gay interests in 
Gay Rights Coalition. A successful disruption of prior legal practice 
was mandated by the effort to maintain allegiance from the gay 
community. Clearly, Eskridge's view is that it was also required by 
moral principle. s1 
Eskridge is surely not a reincarnation of Alexander Bickel, who 
was far more conservative both intellectually and politically. What 
they have in common is an abiding focus on the Lincolnian tension 
between high principle and "business as usual." It is this focus that 
saves Eskridge's work from becoming a banal celebration of judi-
cial activism and provides much of the intellectual energy that per-
vades this book. 
Ill. WEBER: THE PARADIGM CASE REVISITED 
As Phil Frickey has pointed out,82 much of the contemporary 
debate about statutory interpretation has been sparked by the 
Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber,83 which upheld affirmative action under Title VII.84 At least 
for liberals, nowhere is the pressure for a "disruptive" interpreta-
tion so great as it is in the context of affirmative action, for nowhere 
is the tension between legality in the form of text and legislative 
history, and perceived morality in the form of social equality, so 
severe. Understandably, Weber is a central focus of the Eskridge 
book (pp. 14-47, 80, 135, 173, 303-06). In his lengthy discussion of 
Weber, Eskridge seems to have two purposes. The first is to under-
mine Justice Rehnquist's dissent by demonstrating the existence of 
indeterminacy in the statute's text and legislative hist.ory. The sec-
ond is to embed Weber in a larger story about the evolution of Title 
VII law. We will consider these two aspects of Eskridge's analysis 
in that order, ending with a reevaluation of Weber. 
81. See supra note 61 and text accompanying notes 59-63. 
82. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241, 245 (1992). 
83. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber was reaffinned and expanded in Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). All the current casebooks on Legislation use Weber as a 
principal case. 
84. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 197. 
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A. Weber and Legislative Intent 
To understand the problem posed by the Weber case, it is best to 
begin with Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which musters the conven-
tional tools of statutory interpretation for a powerful attack on af-
firmative action.85 Begin with the language of the statute. The 
most directly applicable provision of the statute, section 703( d), 
prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual 
because of his race"86 in any apprenticeship or training program -
the specific setting in Weber. In addition, section 703(a)(2) forbids 
employers from classifying employees "in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual's race."87 As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, on 
its face this language seemed to address the situation of Brian 
Weber, who was unable to gain admission to a training program 
because he was white.88 Moreover, the legislative history contained 
some powerful support for Justice Rehnquist's "color-blind" inter-
pretation of the statute. Hubert Humphrey, "perhaps the primary 
moving force" behind the bill in the Senate, explained that "the 
meaning of racial or religious discrimination is perfectly clear .... 
[I]t means a distinction in treatment given to different individuals 
because of their different race, religion, or national origin. "89 The 
Senate "floor captains" explained its provisions as follows: 
[I]f a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has 
an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect the em-
ployer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non-
discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged - or indeed permitted 
- to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for 
future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special sen-
iority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier. 90 
In terms of the conventional indicia of legislative intent, then, Jus-
tice Rehnquist had a powerful argument against affirmative action. 
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court admitted the force of 
this argument against the legality of affirmative action but empha-
sized that the affirmative action plan had been voluntarily adopted 
85. For a similar analysis by a leading authority on labor law, see Bernard D. Meltzer, 
The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1980). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1994). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994). 
88. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 226-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
89. 443 U.S. at 236 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CoNo. REc. 5423 (1964)). 
Later, Humphrey added that quotas would not be established to maintain racial balance and 
that the bill "would prohibit preferential treatment for any particular group." Weber, 443 
U.S. at 243 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CoNo. REc. 11,848 (1964)). 
90. Weber, 443 U.S. at 240 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CoNo. REC. 7213 
(1964)) (alteration in original). 
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by private parties to eliminate entrenched racial discrimination.91 
Invoking the spirit of the law over its letter, Justice Brennan 
stressed that the supporters of the bill had strongly desired to rem-
edy the inferior employment status thrust upon blacks by 
discrimination.92 
It would be ironic indeed, if a law triggered by a Nation's concern 
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of 
those who had "been excluded from the American dream for so 
long," constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, pri-
vate, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial 
segregation and hierarchy.93 
Justice Brennan bolstered this argument with a heavy reliance on 
section 703(j), which says that the statute should not be interpreted 
to require preferential treatment on the basis of race.94 Notably, 
according to Justice Brennan, section 703 banned only mandatory 
affirmative action, thereby signaling its intention to leave voluntary 
affirmative action intact.95 
As Eskridge remarks, Brennan's opinion is somewhat cavalier 
in its treatment of the text and legislative history (p. 135). Justice 
Blackmun's concurrence is more candid in its discussion of the diffi-
culties of the case. Justice Blackmun remarked that he shared some 
of the "misgivings" expressed by Justice Rehnquist about the origi-
nal intentions of Congress. Nevertheless, he believed that practical 
considerations, "only partially perceived, if perceived at all" by 
Congress, supported the result in the case.96 If read literally, Title 
VII. would put employers in an untenable position, mandating 
either liability to blacks for past discrimination or liability to whites 
for attempting to remedy that discrimination. Thus, Justice Rehn-
quist's interpretation of the statute would make voluntary compli-
ance - even in the form of a "whisper of emphasis on minority 
recruiting" - dubious.97 Justice Blackmun's preference would 
have been to require an arguable past violation of Title VII as a 
justification for affirmative action.98 Given Congress's initial orien-
tation toward color blindness, he found the Court's more expansive 
approach to affirmative action somewhat disturbing. Yet, he was 
ultimately persuaded to join the Brennan opinion.99 
91. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 201. 
92. See 443 U.S. at 201-04. 
93. 443 U.S. at 204 (quoting 110 CoNG. REC. 6552 (1964)) (citation omitted). 
94. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-06. 
95. See 443 U.S. at 205-07. 
96. 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
97. 443 U.S. at 210-11 {Blackmun, J., concurring). 
98. See 443 U.S. at 211 {Blackmun, J., concurring). 
99. See 443 U.S. at 212-13 {Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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Eskridge makes a concerted effort to undermine the Rehnquist-
Blackmun view of legislative intent. As to the statutory text, he 
argues that the term "discrimination" is ambiguous and might not 
include bona fide efforts to promote racial equality (p. 27). As to 
the legislative history, the endorsements of color blindness may 
have been nothing more than "cheap talk" that did not reflect the 
actual views of the majority or the leadership (p. 19). Also, pivotal 
voters such as Senator Dirksen might well have endorsed Justice 
Brennan's principle of managerial freedom, particularly if they had 
been aware of the pressures that the disparate-impact theory of lia-
bility would place on business (pp. 24, 37). 
Despite Eskridge's ingenuity and extensive research, however, 
he fails to rebut Justice Rehnquist's analysis convincingly. Regard-
ing the statutory text, as Eskridge acknowledges, a number of other 
provisions buttress the word "discrimination" and strongly suggest 
a colorblindness reading (pp. 42-43). The cheap-talk explanation of 
the legislative history is also implausible. First, it requires assuming 
that the leadership was willing to take the risk of blatantly misrep-
resenting the meaning of the statute. As Eskridge points out in an-
other context, such misrepresentation is dangerous because of the 
likelihood that other legislators will correct the record (p. 405 
n.127). Second, by the 1960s, Congress was well aware that courts 
might rely on legislative history (pp. 209, 213, 215-18, 234). Talk by 
the sponsors of the bill could not be regarded as "cheap" because it 
carried the known potential to modify the legal interpretation of 
the statute. Finally, although it is possible that Dirksen and his co-
hort would have taken the position posited by Eskridge, in the end 
this is a mere speculation, unsupported by any hard evidence. 
To say that the evidence of legislative intent is strong is not to 
say that it is utterly unambiguous or conclusive. But by conven-
tional standards of statutory interpretation, Justice Rehnquist 
clearly seems to have the better side of the argument. Thus, sup-
porters of Weber need what Eskridge calls a "disruptive" interpre-
tation, one that does more than implement the original expectations 
of the enacting legislators. 
B. Rupture or Reconciliation? 
Although he does make some effort to reconcile Weber with leg-
islative intent, Eskridge's primary historical account portrays Weber 
as part of a rupture. His historical narrative begins after the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act.100 As soon as the statute was passed, 
key players in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and in the civil rights movement were determined to pro-
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to n-6 (1994). 
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mote what Eskridge calls a results-oriented approach to Title VII. 
Given experience under other labor laws, they were dubious that an 
intent-oriented definition of discrimination would be effective and 
instead focused on statistical measures of job equality. They were 
candid about the inconsistency of this approach with the legislative 
compromises embodied in Title VII (p. 73). 
The first fruit of this new approach came in 1971 with Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 101 which adopted the theory of disparate impact 
originated by the NAACP Legal Education and Defense Fund, Inc. 
According to Eskridge, Griggs was at odds with the view of the 
enacting legislature and even with that of the legislature of 1971 (p. 
77) - enough so that the legal community was stunned by the 
unanimous decision.102 Thus, Griggs, like the later decision in 
Weber, resulted from an ideological battle over the meaning of dis-
crimination that had first been fought within the federal govern-
ment and then in the private sector with less complete success. 
This reworking of Title VII reached fruition, Eskridge says, in 
Weber. "The thrust of the Court's opinion in Weber," according to 
Eskridge, was our country's commitment to results, based on the 
statute's goal of obtaining compensatory justice for an oppressed 
minority (p. 40). Thus, "[d]uring the 1970s the EEOC, the Supreme 
Court, and Congress worked together toward a proportional repre-
sentation ideology, encoded in Title VII through the Griggs and 
Weber decisions making disparate impact a. form of discrimination 
and allowing voluntary affirmative action" (p. 304). In short, volun-
tary affirmative action was not considered a form of discrimination 
(pp. 40-41). On Eskridge's interpretation, Weber was something 
like Judge Moore's dissent in Boutilier:103 a fundamental reworking 
of a statutory concept to correspond with more progressive social 
norms. 
Eskridge's interpretation seems plausible if we think only of Jus-
tice Brennan, the author of the opinion. Yet it fails when we con-
sider some aspects of the opinion in historical context. Perhaps the 
most obvious difficulty is that Justice Brennan carefully refrains 
from attempting to reconcile the result with the statutory term "dis-
crimination." His majority opinion makes no effort to read the 
term "discrimination" as involving some evolving social norm of 
equality, and for good reason. He simply did not have solid major-
ity support for an expansive redefinition of the concept of discrimi-
101. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
102. P. 74; see also Earl Maltz, The Legacy of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: A Case Study in 
the Impact of a Modernist Statutory Precedent, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1353, 1357 ("Commenta-
tors of all stripes have concluded that Congress did not consciously intend to adopt impact 
analysis in Title VII."). 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
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nation. In Bakke, 104 a majority of the Court had recently construed 
a companion provision to Title VII more narrowly, with four Jus-
tices allowing no affirmative action and a fifth Justice allowing only 
restricted use of affirmative action.105 Moreover, in constitutional 
decisions expressing its own best understanding of racial equality, 
the Court had rebuffed efforts to define "disparate impact" as dis-
crimination.106 Thus, Brennan would not have been able to secure 
firm support for a "rupture" with color blindness in favor of a result 
orientation. 
In order to distinguish Weber from Bakke, Brennan needed a 
different kind of argument. He had to accentuate the private na-
ture of the affirmative action in Weber, as opposed to the federally 
subsidized state program in Bakke. His discussion of the overall 
goals of Title VII in promoting black interests arguably distin-
guished it from other portions of the 1964 Act with narrower 
goals,107 but realistically, little justification existed for attributing 
fundamentally divergent purposes to various parts of the Act. For 
this reason, Brennan's second argument was particularly important 
because it rested on a statutory provision, section 703(j), that had 
no counterpart in Bakke and related to a well-established tradition 
of employer autonomy in labor law. In short, rather than announc-
ing a brave new interpretation of the concept of discrimination, 
Brennan structured his opinion precisely to avoid the necessity of 
such a conceptual leap. 
Perhaps Brennan could have carried the day in Weber with a 
broader, more conceptual opinion. Because two Justices - Ste-
vens and Powell - had recused themselves, he needed only to hold 
his four-Justice block from Bakke to "win" the case. But this would 
have been a pyrrhic victory because of the likelihood that a 4-3 win 
would be overturned as soon as the full Court heard another affirm-
ative action case. Hence, he needed to pick up Justice Stewart's 
vote and preferably to stake out a position that Justice Powell 
104. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
105. In Bakke, four Justices held that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, whose lan-
guage is rather similar to that of Title VII, bans all affirmative action by recipients of federal 
funds. See 438 U.S. 265, 408-21 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart & 
Rehnquist, JJ.). Justice Powell equated the statutory antidiscrimination standard with the 
concept of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and held that the latter allows 
affirmative action only in the presence of a compelling governmental interest such as reme-
dying past illegal discrimination or attaining diversity in an educational institution. See 438 
U.S. at 281-320. For a case from the Johnson era showing a similar lack of enthusiasm for 
affirmative action in a constitutional setting, see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 
(1986) (invalidating layoff plan designed to prevent erosion of diversity). 
106. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
107. Brennan relegated his effort to draw this distinction to a footnote and cited only two 
passing remarks in the Congressional Record. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979). 
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would also be willing to endorse in future cases. In addition, Justice 
Blackmun's concurrence makes it clear that he would have had 
great difficulty in joining a broader opinion. Justice Brennan's 
opinion in Weber was almost certainly the best outcome he could 
obtain. Despite its inadequacy under conventional legal criteria, 
Justice Brennan's opinion brilliantly succeeded in dealing with the 
situation he faced on the Court, confirming his reputation as an out-
standing tactician. 
In reality, rather than endorsing affirmative action, the thrust of 
Weber was to privatize it. Later cases highlight the Court's determi-
nation to allow voluntary affirmative action under Title VII while 
providing a much cooler reception to coercive affirmative action, 
even by a federal court.1os Indeed, the Court went so far as to dis-
tinguish a program created by a consent decree, voluntary and 
therefore permissible, from one created by a judicial modification 
of a consent decree, coercive and therefore closely scrutinized.109 
Thus, despite its analytic difficulties, the line identified by Weber 
between voluntary and coerced programs stood the test of time.110 
Rather than being a rupture, Justice Brennan's decision has 
more of the reconciliatory quality of Judge Mack in Gay Rights. 111 
While leaving affirmative action in the public sector restricted 
under Bakke and its successor cases, the Court left more leeway in 
the less politicized private sphere. It thus attempted to reconcile 
the original expectations of the statute's framers with the perceived 
needs of the black community and the practical needs of the busi-
ness community. Only one group was left out of this concord -
white blue-collar workers, who were soon to manifest their political 
displeasure.112 Although, as in the abortion area, the Court's pre-
diction of the future may have failed to anticipate the backlash 
108. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding voluntary 
employer plan under lenient standard of review); Local No. 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. 
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (upholding affirmative action consent decree regard-
less of whether court would have had power to enter same decree as remedy for proven 
violation). 
109. In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), the Court over-
turned a lower court order adjusting layoffs in order to preserve gains under an affirmative 
action plan. In Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), the Court upheld a judicial affirma-
tive action order only after careful scrutiny to determine its necessity. But in Local 93, the 
Court required such scrutiny only when an affirmative action plan Jacked the consent of the 
employer, as when it was a judicial modification of a consent decree as opposed to being part 
of the decree itself. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 528. 
110. Notably, recent opposition to affirmative action, such as the current California initia-
tive proposal, is also focused on government-mandated programs. See Deborah Malamud, 
The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2260 n.105 (1995) 
(quoting California initiative). 
111. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 
A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). See also supra text accompanying notes 62-63. 
112. The rise of the conservative wing of the Republican party to national power under 
Ronald Reagan received a considerable boost from white opposition to affirmative action. 
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against what it considered progressive views, Justice Brennan's 
Weber approach has managed to survive for almost a generation. It 
remains to be seen whether, as Bickel asked about the Warren 
Court, the Weber Court's gamble on the future will pay off in the 
end.113 
C. Final Thoughts on Weber 
On conventional legal grounds, Justice Brennan's opinion is far 
less satisfactory than Justice Rehnquist's. Yet, it is difficult to en-
dorse the Rehnquist opinion wholeheartedly, particularly its tone of 
self-righteousness. In his closing, Justice Rehnquist invokes the 
spirit of the Act, which rings out with "unmistakable clarity" -
"[i]t is equality."114 He then quotes Senator Dirksen's statement 
that "[e]quality of opportunity ... is the mass conscience of man-
kind that speaks in every generation, and it will continue to speak 
long after we are dead and gone."115 Nothing is more destructive to 
equality than the quota, which Justice Rehnquist calls "a creator of 
castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order to prefer 
another."116 In passing Title VII, Justice Rehnquist continues, Con-
gress outlawed "all racial discrimination, recognizing that no dis-
crimination based on race is benign, that no action disadvantaging a 
person because of his color is affirmative."117 
Rousing language, but a little grating when we recall its author-
ship. Justice Rehnquist's stirring belief in racial equality was seem-
ingly absent in 1954, when he was a law clerk during the Brown 
case, or during the civil rights movement, which he opposed.118 In-
deed, even during his distinguished career on the Court, little sign 
can be seen of a desire to eradicate racial inequality. Justice Bren-
nan says that it would be "ironic indeed" if the effect of the 1964 
See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 
897-98 (1994). 
113. BICKEL, supra note 66, at 173. 
114. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
115. 443 U.S. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CoNG. REc. 14,510 (1964)). 
116. Weber, 443 U.S. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
117. 443 U.S. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
118. At the time of the 1964 Act, Justice Rehnquist strongly opposed a similar public-
accommodation law in Phoenix. See 8 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATION OF SUPREME 
CouRT JUSTICES 357 (Roy Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1977) [hereinafter SUPREME 
CoURT HEARINGS]. Ten years earlier, he drafted a memo for Justice Jackson defending the 
separate-but-equal rule. There is some debate about the surrounding circumstances, but cer-
tainly no evidence that he supported the result in Brown at the time. See MARK v. TusHNET, 
MAKING CIVIL R1mrrs LAw 190 (1994). As late as 1974, Justice Rehnquist's sensitivity to 
racial issues was sufficiently low that he overlooked his lawyer's notice of a restrictive racial 
covenant on property he was purchasing. See l2A SUPREME COURT HEARINGS, supra, at 
1510-11 (1989). 
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Civil Rights Act were to block voluntary efforts to diminish 
inequality.119 It is at least equally ironic that the spirit of the Act 
should be trumpeted so valiantly by those having least sympathy 
with its passage.120 
Yet Justice Brennan's opinion is also unsatisfactory. Although a 
tactical success in terms of coalition building, it gives little credence 
to the critical statutory text or the legislative history. It also ignores 
reality to the extent that much "voluntary" affirmative action was in 
fact a response to government pressure, whether in the form of 
threatened litigation or federal contracting rules.121 Finally, as later 
events have made clear, it was dangerously dismissive toward the 
interests and views of white workers, who responded by aban-
doning liberalism as an ideology. 
Hard cases make bad law not because judges are weak or stupid, 
but because hard cases often have no really good solutions. In 
Weber, the Court faced a choice between more or less unsatisfac-
tory solutions, Of the available options in Weber, the approach 
sketched in Justice Blackmun's concurrence, and later elaborated 
by Justice O'Connor,122 seems to do the least total damage to the 
legal fabric. It would allow affirmative action only to correct or 
avoid statistical disparities between the employer's hiring or promo-
tion and the relevant qualified labor pool. This solution is not 
wholly satisfactory. It strains somewhat against the text of Title VII 
and its legislative history, but not to the breaking point. It would 
give blacks less than they might fairly claim as a matter of social 
justice because it ignores the lingering effects of pre-enactment dis-
crimination. It would not be wholly satisfactory to white workers, 
but it does not treat them as harshly as Justice Brennan's solution. 
It is, in short, the least unsatisfactory among the flawed options 
available. 
This interpretation rests on the theory that the statute should 
not be construed to be self-defeating. Consider, by analogy, a stat-
ute that forbids starting fires in a state park. It would be one thing 
to construe the statute to permit any fire that would advance the 
statute's general purpose of making the park enjoyable. That inter-
119. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204. 
120. Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson presents a similar irony. In arguing for an inter-
pretation of Title VII according to what he considers its clear language, he waxes indignantly 
on the injustice played by affirmative action on white workers. Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Though his concerns in Johnson may 
well have some foundation, the irony remains: When has he ever shown similar anger at 
discrimination against blacks? See generally Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: 
Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia's Mccleskey 
Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1035, 1038, 1061, 1078, 1086 (1994). 
121. Justice Blackmun's opinion is more candid in this respect. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 
209 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
122. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649-53. 
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pretation is analogous to Justice Brennan's position in Weber. It is 
another matter, however, to allow a backfire to be set when the 
park is threatened by a forest fire. Like the "arguable violation" 
theory under Title VII, allowing backfires only seeks to save the 
statute from the irony of self-defeat. 
The Blackmun-O'Connor interpretation of Title VII is, like 
most compromises, a bit unsatisfactory on general principle. Per-
haps, however, Hadrian would approve of this effort to make the 
law worthy of the allegiance of all groups within our society. 
As the example of Weber shows, Eskridge's analysis may not 
always win converts even from sympathetic audiences. In the end, 
he may not even have a coherent dogma that a convert might em-
brace, for his "critical pragmatism" seems as much a style of analy-
sis as a coherent theory. But engaging Eskridge's ideas can force us 
to deepen our own thinking and come to a greater awareness of the 
profound issues posed by statutory interpretation. That is enough 
to make Dynamic Statutory Interpretation an important book. 
